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IN THE SUPREME COURT OF THE STATE OF UTAH 
SHIRLEY GILLMOR, as Personal 
Representative of the Estate 
of Stephen T. Gillmor, 
Plaintiff-Appellant, 
vs. 
DENNIS K. WRIGHT, SARA C. 
WRIGHT, DAVID L. WRIGHT, 
RONA R. WRIGHT, 
Defendants-Respondents/ 
Cross-Appellants, 
and 
CHARLES F. GILLMOR, 
EDWARD LESLIE GILLMOR, 
Intervenor-Defendants-
Respondents/Cross-Appellants, 
REPLY BRIEF OF CROSS-APPELLANT EDWARD LESLIE GILLMOR 
SUMMARY OF ARGUMENT 
1. The trial court' s finding that the court in the 
Partition Action intended to exclude Edward and Charles Gillmor 
from access for grazing purposes to the major portion of their 
land is clearly erroneous and against the weight of the evidence. 
The question of easements was not an issue in the Partition 
Action. All of the parties in that action intended that 
traditional access would be given to the respective parcels 
awarded to the parties. The trial court in the Partition Action 
was not required to resolve disputed issues of fact regarding the 
Sawmill Canyon Road. The legal description for the road was 
stipulated to by the parties and was based on erroneous 
Case No. 890257 
Priority No. 16 
assumptions by Richard Huffman, who was hired as an expert 
witness by Florence Gillmor and Charles Gillmor. The weight of 
the evidence was that the parties to the Partition Action 
intended that full access would be given to the parties to the 
property awarded to them in the Partition Action. Because of the 
mistaken description, Edward Gillmor is entitled to reform the 
Partition Decree pursuant to his independent action in equity. 
2. Even if Edward Gillmor' s independent action in 
equity fails, he has still established all of the elements for 
the an easement by implication or by necessity. Notions of 
finality ought not to prevent access to his partitioned property 
and his claim for an easement. 
ARGUMENT 
I. 
THE TRIAL COURT ERRED IN DISMISSING EDWARD L. 
GILLMOR7S CLAIM TO REFORM OR CORRECT THE 
DESCRIPTION OF THE SAWMILL CANYON ROAD 
IN THE PARTITION DECREE. 
A. The t r i a l c o u r t ' s f i n d i n g t h a t t h e c o u r t i n 
t h e P a r t i t i o n A c t i o n flifl n o t i n t e n f l t o fry/frrfl 
h im a n d C h a r l e s F. G i l l m o r a n e a s e m e n t o v e r 
S h i r l e y G i l l m o r 7 s l a n d i s c l e a r l y e r r o n e o u s . 
In spite of the overwhelming evidence introduced at the 
trial of the present case that the error in the description of 
the Sawmill Canyon Road in the Partition Decree was the result of 
a mutual mistake, the lower court found that "[t]he trial court 
in the partition action did not intend to provide Edward Gillmor 
-2-
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and Charles Gillmor access over parcels awarded to Florence 
Gillmor. " (Finding of Fact No. 28, R. 884. ) In his initial 
brief in this appeal, Edward L. Gillmor attempted to marshal all 
of the evidence in support of the trial court' s finding and to 
demonstrate that the finding was clearly erroneous. Because 
Shirley Gillmor claimed in her brief, however, that he failed to 
meet his burden,l Edward Gillmor summarizes the evidence for and 
against the lower court7 s finding below: 
1. Th$ evidence in gyppprl; Qf the triftl 
court7 s finding. 
The only evidence regarding the court' s intent in the 
Partition Action is found in its Findings of Fact and Conclusions 
of Law entered in that case. Yet the finding with respect to the 
Sawmill Canyon Road was not a result of a finding of fact on 
disputed evidence. Rather, the description of the easement over 
the Sawmill Canyon Road contained in the Findings of Fact in the 
Partition Action was stipulated to by the parties. It was first 
submitted to the court by counsel for Charles F. Gillmor at the 
hearing held on March 4, 1980, as Exhibit 113-D (marked Exhibit 
D-46 in the present case), with the acknowledgement that it was 
unsurveyed and that it could be modified by survey and further 
order of the court. 
1
 Brief of Shirley Gillmor in Response to to Edward L. 
Gillmor's brief (hereinafter "Shirley Gillmor brief"), at 15. 
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In her brief, Shirley Gillmor ignores this crucial 
piece of evidence. Judge Leary made no finding other than to 
accept the stipulation of the parties. He had no intent other 
than that the parties' stipulation be incorporated into the 
Partition Decree. There is no evidence whatsoever that Judge 
Leary actually intended to deny Edward and Charles Gillmor access 
to the parcels awarded to them. 
Shirley Gillmor notes in her brief,2 that at the 
hearing of March 4, 1980, Judge Leary informed counsel for Edward 
Gillmor that he would entertain a motion to strike Exhibit 113-D 
if it did not appear to be in order. Edward Gillmor failed to 
discover the error in the description of the Sawmill Canyon Road 
until 1987, although other errors were later discovered by the 
parties and corrected. 3 It was a mistake that the legal 
description for the Sawmill Canyon Road in Exhibit 113-D did not 
give Edward or Charles traditional rights of access to the 
parcels awarded to them and it was also a mistake that the error 
in the metes and bounds description was not discovered sooner 
than it was. Edward Gillmor and Charles Gillmor both concede the 
L
 Shirley Gillmor brief, at 6. 
3
 The circumstances surrounding the discovery of the error 
in the description were discussed in Edward Gillmor' s initial 
brief, at 22-23. 
-4-
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mistake in the present case.4 The issue here is not whether 
there was a mistake, but whether Edward and Charles Gillmor are 
entitled to an order in the present case correcting an obvious 
error, neither intended by the parties to the Partition Action 
nor by the court in that case. 
To summarize, the only evidence of the trial court' s 
intent in the Partition Action was its Findings of Fact, which 
included a description of the Sawmill Canyon Road taken from 
Exhibit 113-D. Exhibit 113-D was introduced by the stipulation 
of the parties during the trial of the Partition Action, and was 
not the result of a resolution by the court of disputed facts.5 
The mistake in the legal description originated with 
Charles Gillmor' s counsel and with his expert witness, Richard 
Huffman, in the Partition Action. (Tr. Vol. I, at 136. ) In spite 
of the obvious fact that Charles Gillmor would not have intended a 
mistake that excluded him from access to all but five acres of his 
property (as he testified in the present case, Tr. Vol. I, at 63, 
137-39), Shirley Gillmor insists that Judge Leary intended that 
neither Edward nor Charles have traditional rights of access to the 
parcels awarded to them in the Partition Action. The trial court 
in the present case found that the Sawmill Canyon Road provides the 
only traditional grazing access to the eastern portions of their 
property. (Finding of Fact No. 25, R. 884. ) Judge Leary did not 
intend to deny that access. All he intended was to adopt the 
description of the rights-of-way in Exhibit 113-D. 
5
 As argued below, the description of the Sawmill Canyon 
Road found at page 60 of the Findings of Fact in the Partition 
Action was inconsistent with the description of the same right-of-
way found at page 21 of the same Findings of Fact, thus undermining 
Shirley Gillmor' s argument that the court in the Partition Action 
somehow intended to deny Edward and Charles Gillmor access to the 
major portion of the property awarded to them. 
-5-
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2. The evidence against the trial court' s 
finding. 
In her brief, Shirley Gillmor ignores the fact that 
rights of access were never in dispute in the Partition Action. 
All parties agreed that they would have full rights of access to 
whichever parcels were awarded to them. There was no need for 
the trial court in the Partition Action to make specific findings 
or to resolves disputes in the evidence regarding easements. 6 
All of the parties to the Partition Action assumed that, 
whichever theory of partition was followed by the court, they 
would be given full access to the property awarded to them. 
In her brief, Shirley Gillmor claims that Edward 
Gillmor argued at the trial of the Partition Action and in his 
two appeals that the partition theory espoused by Florence and 
Charles was unfair "because it precludes traditional access to 
his property and traditional use of his property for grazing 
livestock."7 This assertion is untrue and is unsupported by any 
evidence in either the Partition Action or in the record of the 
present case. In the Partition Action it was always contemplated 
that, regardless of how the Gillmor Ranch was partitioned, the 
As Edward Gillmor argued in his initial brief on appeal 
in the present case, access and rights-of-way were never in dispute 
in the Partition Action. The only dispute was the theory of 
partition to be used. See Edward Gillmor' s brief, at 13 n. 6, 25. 
7
 Shirley Gillmor brief, at 18. 
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parties would have traditional access to the properties awarded 
to them. 8 
Whether or not the property awarded could be put to its 
11
 traditional use" depended on the specific property received, 
taking into account the entire 34,000 acre ranch as a whole. 
Some parcels partitioned were no longer suitable for the 
"traditional use" of livestock grazing, while other parcels were 
still livestock grazing land. All of the parties to the 
Partition Action were not in the livestock business. In the 
Partition Action, Edward Gillmor' s position was that each parcel 
should not be divided into four equal parcels because the smaller 
separate parcels in some cases would be difficult, if not 
impossible, to use. Instead, he argued that it would be better 
to award a whole parcel to each party based on the utility of the 
specific parcel. For example, parcels in urban areas should, 
when possible, be awarded to those not in the livestock business 
while parcels suitable for grazing should, where possible, be 
awarded to those parties in that business. The parties and the 
8
 In the Partition Action, Edward Gillmor did not object to 
the opposing theory of partition because it would deny him access, 
but because it would make it difficult for him to conduct a 
traditional ranching enterprise if each parcel were partitioned 
into smaller equal pieces, rather than dividing up the parcels 
between the parties based upon the utility of each parcel. See 
Gillmor v. Gillmor, 637 P. 2d at 737 (quoted in Edward Gillmor' s 
initial brief in the present case, at 13 n. 6). 
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court in the Partition Action agreed that access for traditional 
uses would be given to the parcels partitioned. With respect to 
the Sawmill property, the court in the Partition Action 
specifically found that the present use of that property was 
"grazing," and that the highest and best use of the property was 
"[g]razing and recreational."9 Edward and Charles Gillmor 
should have received traditional access to each parcel awarded to 
them including the Sawmill property, the highest and best use for 
which is grazing, even after the partition. Because of the error 
in the description of the easement, this access was denied. The 
lower court in the present case specifically found that without 
use of the road, neither Edward nor Charles Gillmor have 
traditional grazing access to the parcels awarded to them under 
the Partition Decree. 10 
Shirley Gillmor also cites the so-called Trespass Case 
between the parties, as evidence that Edward Gillmor "has 
consistently refused to accept the fact that he cannot continue 
to operate as he has in the past." (Shirley Gillmor brief, at 19 
n. 9) Her reading of that case, however, is mistaken. It had 
nothing to do with any refusal by Edward Gillmor to accept the 
results of the Partition Action. Rather, that case focused on 
y
 Finding of Fact No. 31 in the Partition Action. (Exhibit 
33, at 21 in the present case. ) 
10
 Finding of Fact No. 25, R. 884. 
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difficulties created because of migration of cattle from one 
unfenced parcel to another on parcels in Salt Lake County. 
(Testimony of Edward L. Gillmor, Jr. , Tr. Vol. I, at 48-50. ) 
After his initial decision in the Trespass Case relating to 
activities occurring in 1981, Judge Dennis Frederick, of the 
Third Judicial District Court, dismissed later trespass claims 
and counterclaims between the parties arising out of ranching 
activities in 1984. Noting that ,f [t]he boundaries of the 
separate parcels are, for the most part, unfenced,"11 Judge 
Frederick found: 
There have been numerous incidents in the 
year 1984 of Stephen T. Gillmor' s sheep 
grazing on land owned by Edward Leslie 
Gillmor, and numerous incidents in the year 
1984 of Edward Leslie Gillmor's cattle and 
sheep grazing on parcels of land owned by 
Florence Gillmor and Charles F. Gillmor and 
leased from them by Stephen T. Gillmor, but 
the proof has not been clear and convincing 
that each party had the ability to comply 
strictly with the Judgment and Permanent 
Injunction and that each party had willfully 
and knowingly violated such Judgment and 
Permanent Injunction. 
11
 Findings of Fact and Conclusions of Law in Gillmor v. 
Gillmor, Third Judicial District Court, Civil Nos. C81-3875 and 
C82-3490), the so-called "Trespass Case." The Findings of Fact 
and Conclusions of Law were submitted to the trial court in the 
present case by way of a post-trial submission. They have been 
designated as part of the supplemental record in this case pursuant 
to Rule 11(h), Utah Rules of Appellate Procedure. A copy of the 
Findings of Fact and Conclusions of Law in the Trespass Case are 
attached hereto as Exhibit B. 
-9-
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(Finding of Fact No. 5 from the Trespass Case.) The dispute 
between the parties caused by the lack of fencing has nothing to 
do with Edward Gillmor' s inability to have access to the Sawmill 
property because of the mistake in the Partition Decree and has 
no bearing on the present case. The issue in the present case is 
simply whether Edward Gillmor can use to Sawmill Canyon Road to 
transport livestock to his portion of the Sawmill property, which 
is now fenced. 
As indicated above, the parties to the Partition Action 
intended that full access would be given to each party to the 
parcels awarded to that party. Access was not an issue in that 
case. During the first trial of the Partition Action, Florence 
Gillmor (Shirley7 s predecessor) and Charles Gillmor jointly filed 
a "Petition Relating to Procedure to be Followed in Partitioning 
Land," in 1976 in which they requested the court to divide each 
parcel at issue into four equal parcels with "cross easements to 
be awarded all parties to provide traditional means of access to 
each tract." (Exhibit D-50, at 1; emphasis added.) 
This intent was demonstrated further by the evidence 
that during the Partition Action, the parties and their counsel 
travelled over the Sawmill Canyon Road to the top of the plateau 
for the purpose of inspecting the property and the available 
access. (Tr. Vol. I, at 49-50, 76, 129-30.) At the trial of the 
present case both Edward L. Gillmor, Jr. , and Charles F. Gillmor 
-10-
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(who were adversaries in the Partition Action) testified that 
there was a mutual agreement between the parties during the trip 
that, regardless of how the Sawmill property was partitioned, 
access would be available by the Sawmill Canyon Road. (Tr. Vol. 
I, at 59-60, 130-32, 143-45, 148, 162. ) 
The intent of the parties to provide a right-of-way 
over the Sawmill Canyon Road was further demonstrated by the only 
testimony given at the trial of the Partition Action relating to 
the terrain of the Sawmill property. At the first trial, Stephen 
T. Gillmor (Shirley Gillmor' s deceased husband and her 
predecessor in interest) testified that all parties would have to 
have access to the partitioned parcels of the Sawmill property by 
way of the Sawmill Canyon Road: 
Q [By Mr Lee] With respect to the 
various parcels, if a division were to be 
made by this Court, would it be necessary to 
have access up the road you' ve referred to 
across the various parcels? Would that 
access have to be available to all parties? 
A. Definitely so. The topography is 
so steep and rugged in the rear portion of 
this it is the only vehicle access into the 
area. 
So very definitely, this access would be 
-- have to be left open for all parties to 
make use of the parcel. 
(Transcript of First Trial in the Partition Action, at 335). 12 
u
 This passage was quoted in Edward L. Gillmor' s initial 
brief, at 17. The trial court in the present case took judicial 
(continued. . . ) 
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Stephen Gillmor' s testimony shows not only that the 
Sawmill Canyon Road provides the only reasonable access to the 
Sawmill property, but it also shows that he was agreeable 
(speaking for Florence Gillmor) that the road be available for 
use by all parties to the Partition Action, regardless of who was 
awarded which parcel. 
As noted above, the error in the description of the 
right-of-way contained in the Partition Decree was created by 
Richard Huffman, an expert hired by Charles Gillmor. He assumed 
that the parties would have access to their properties across the 
Wright' s property and up Thirtyfive Canyon. See Edward L. 
Gillmor7 s initial brief on appeal, at 19-22. Huffman' s 
assumptions were erroneous, which resulted in the mistaken 
description in the Findings of Fact and in the Partition 
Decree. 13 He testified in the present case that his goal was to 
(. . . continued) 
notice of the entire court file in the Partition Action, including 
the transcript from which the passage quoted above was taken. The 
parties in the present case have stipulated that those portions of 
the transcript reviewed by the lower court in the present case 
should be added to the record on appeal and that a supplemental 
record should be prepared by the clerk of the district court. A 
copy of the portion of the transcript quoted above is attached 
hereto as Exhibit A. 
13
 Huffman' s assumptions about access were even more 
erroneous with regard to Edward Gillmor' s property. Even assuming 
that access were available from the highway, over the Wright 
property, and up Thirtyfive Canyon, Edward Gillmor was given no 
easement across Charles Gillmor' s property to his own. (See the 
map attached to Edward Gillmor' s initial brief as Exhibit A. ) 
(continued. . . ) 
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divide the Sawmill property into four parcels that were equal in 
terms of "quality and quantity,"14 that could be of equal 
"usability" for gazing purposes, which he believed was the 
highest and best use of the property. 15 
Huffman never testified in the Partition Action on the 
issue of access and his recommendations regarding easements were 
never at issue. The trial court in that case was not required to 
choose to believe his testimony over other witnesses. The only 
mention during the partition trial of Huffman' s easement 
descriptions occurred on March 4, 1980, where counsel for Charles 
Gillmor informed Judge Leary: 
And the proposed stipulation is that if Mr. 
Huffman were called to testify, that he would 
testify that he prepared those descriptions 
using existing roads wherever possible; that 
they are the best descriptions he can make 
without an on-the-ground survey; and we would 
submit that they could be modified by survey 
13
 (. . . continued) 
Thus, even under Huffman' s assumptions, Edward Gillmor would have 
no access to his property from the south. 
14
 Tr. Vol. I, at 206-07. 
15
 Tr. Vol. I, at 207. See also Huffman' s testimony at Tr. 
Vol. I, at 215. 
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and by further order of the court should thev 
prove unreasonable. 
(Exhibit D-47; emphasis added. ) 1 6 
In her brief, Shirley Gillmor ignores the fact that 
Huffman was hired by Charles Gillmor as well as by Florence 
Gillmor. As he testified at the trial of the present case, 17 
Charles Gillmor did not intend that he should have no access to 
the eastern portion of his property. 18 It makes no sense to 
believe that Judge Leary truly intended to exclude Charles and 
Edward Gillmor from access to the major portions of their 
property for grazing purposes, particularly since those eastern 
portions were the most desirable for grazing cattle, which was 
the occupation of both Charles and Edward Gillmor. 19 
16
 Shirley Gillmor quoted this passage in her brief in the 
present case, without commenting on the clear implications of Mr. 
Clegg' s statement. He was not offering it as a perfect and 
complete description of all easements that would be necessary to 
give traditional rights of access over the approximately 34,000 
acres being partitioned. Rather, he recognized that it might 
contain errors, and stipulated that corrections could thereafter be 
made to correct such errors, should the descriptions prove 
unreasonable. 
17
 Tr. Vol. I, at 63, 136-39. 
18
 In the present case, the trial court found that neither 
Charles nor Edward Gillmor have traditional grazing access to the 
eastern portions of their Sawmill property unless they are allowed 
access over the property awarded to Florence Gillmor. (Finding of 
Fact No. 25, R. 884. ) 
19
 This argument is supported by Huffman' s own testimony in 
the present case that his goal devising a plan for the partitioning 
of the Sawmill property was to create four separate parcels of 
(continued. . . ) 
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The court' s finding in the present case that Judge 
Leary intended to exclude Charles and Edward Gillmor from having 
traditional access along the Sawmill Canyon Road is further 
eroded by the contradictions between the two descriptions of the 
right-of-way in the Findings of Fact in the Partition Action. In 
her brief, Shirley seems to concede that the Findings of Fact 
contains contradictory descriptions of the right-of-way on the 
Sawmill property. (Shirley Gillmor brief, at 8 n. 5. ) As Edward 
Gillmor pointed out in his initial brief in this case, at 18-19, 
the description on page 21 of the Findings of Fact in the 
Partition Action is different from the description contained on 
Exhibit 113-D (which was used at page 60 of the Findings of 
Fact). The description at page 21 defines the entirety of the 
Sawmill Canyon Road, as it has traditionally been used. (Tr. 
Vol. I, at 65-69. ) The description at page 21 is inconsistent 
with the description of the right-of-way at page 60, which was 
used in the Partition Decree. This contradiction between 
descriptions within the Findings of Fact in the Partition Action 
demonstrates the mistake in the description ultimately used in 
the Partition Decree. 20 
iy(. . . continued) 
equal value and usability for grazing purposes. (Tr. Vol. I, at 
206-07, 215. ) 
20
 In her brief, Shirley Gillmor questions whether Edward 
Gillmor was aware that the description on page 60 of the Findings 
(continued...) 
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The trial court' s finding that the court in the 
Partition Action intended to deny Edward and Charles Gillmor from 
traditional access for grazing to their property is against the 
clear weight of the evidence and should be reversed. 
B. Shirley Gillmor misconstrues this Court7 s 
decision in St. Pierre v. Edmonds. 
In her brief, Shirley Gillmor cited St. Pierre v. 
Edmonds, 645 P. 2d 615 (Utah 1987), for the proposition that "an 
independent action is allowed only to remedy an error caused by 
an affirmative act that is so insidious as to possibly undermine 
the very integrity of the judicial system itself.11 (Shirley 
Gillmor brief, at 17; emphasis added. ) St. Pierre held no such 
thing. That case involved allegations of fraud upon the court 
based on claims that the plaintiff had assented to a settlement 
agreement as a result of harassment, threats, abuse, and 
intimidation by her ex-husband. The case does not state that in 
independent action will only lie for such claims or that such an 
action is no longer viable to remedy errors based on mutual 
mistakes of fact in legal descriptions. 
(. . . continued) 
of Fact in the Partition Action was the same as the description in 
Exhibit 113-D. (Shirley Gillmor brief, at 8, n. 5. ) Edward 
Gillmor, however, did not overlook that fact in his initial brief. 
(Edward Gillmor brief, at 18-19 & n. 11. ) The point that Edward 
Gillmor sought to make is that the description of the right-of-way 
on page 21 of the Findings of Fact is different from the 
description on page 60, which was taken from Exhibit 113-D. This, 
again, points up the mistake in the description ultimately used in 
the Partition Decree. 
-16-
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Contrary to Shirley Gillmor's assertions,21 St. Pierre 
did not overrule Eaan v. Eaan, 560 P. 2d 704, 705-06 (Utah 1977), 
Stewart v. Sullivan, 29 Utah 2d 156, 506 P. 2d 74, 76 (1973), or 
Nev v. Harrison. 5 Utah 2d 217, 299 P. 2d 1114, 1116 (1956), each 
of which was cited by Edward Gillmor in his initial brief22 for 
the rule that mutual mistakes or erroneous assumptions may 
justify setting aside a decree under an independent action in 
equity or under Rule 60(b)(7). In St. Pierre this Court 
implicitly recognized the validity of that rule by the 
authorities it cited in its opinion. For example, the Court in 
St. Pierre cited 11 Wright & Miller, Federal Practice and 
Procedure § 2868 (1973). 645 P.2d at 618. As Edward Gillmor 
noted in his initial brief, that treatise specifically provides 
that an independent action in equity "also will lie on the basis 
of accident or of mistake. " Id. § 2868, at 239-40. The St. 
Pierre opinion further cited 7 Moore' s Federal Practice §§ 60. 31, 
60.36 (2d ed. 1979). 645 P. 2d at 618. In that treatise, 
Professor Moore stated: 
Relief from a judgment by an independent 
action on the basis of accident or mistake is 
less common than relief on the basis of 
fraud, but, nevertheless, both accident and 
mistake afford the basis for relief in an 
appropriate situation . . . . 
dl
 Shirley Gillmor7 s brief, at 17 n. 8. 
22
 See Edward Gillmor's brief, at 37-38. 
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7 Moore' s Federal Practice 11 60. 37[1], at 60-381 (2d ed. 1990) 
(footnotes omitted). 23 
Finally, the Court in St. Pierre also cited Moore, 
"Federal Relief from Civil Judgments," 55 Yale L. J. 623 (1946). 
645 P. 2d at 618. That article was relied on by the court in West 
Virginia Oil & Gas Co. v. George E. Breece Lumber Co. . 213 F. 2d 
702 (5th Cir. 1954), for the principle that a federal court, in 
an independent action in equity, has jurisdiction to modify a 
final judgment in a former proceeding on the ground of mistake as 
well as fraud. 213 F. 2d at 706. 
Shirley Gillmor has plainly misread St. Pierre, which 
supports Edward Gillmor' s independent action for mistake by the 
authorities on which it relies. The validity of the rule of 
Egan, Stewart, and Ney relating to independent actions and Rule 
60(b)(7) motions is consistent with St. Pierre and with the other 
courts who have allowed such mechanisms to remedy errors caused 
by mistakes or erroneous assumptions. Having failed to read all 
of the authorities cited in St. Pierre, Shirley Gillmor argues 
that this Court should ignore the non-Utah authorities "because 
their influence is minimal" in light of the Court' s St. Pierre 
decision.24 These other authorities,25 however, should not be 
" In support, Professor Moore cites the case of West 
Virginia Oil & Gas Co. v. George E. Breece Lumber Co. , 213 F. 2d 702 
(5th Cir. 1954), quoted by Edward Gillmor in his initial brief. 
24
 Shirley Gillmor brief, at 17 n. 8. 
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disregarded simply because the St. Pierre case did not involve a 
mutual mistake of fact relating to a legal description. Rather, 
they give additional validity to the Eaan, Stewart, and Ney 
opinions. St. Pierre should not be read as limiting independent 
actions solely to those involving fraud. 
Shirley Gillmor contends in her brief, 26 that West 
Virginia Oil & Gas Company v. George E. Breece Lumber, 213 F.2d 
702 (5th Cir. 1954), is inapplicable because it held that a 
judgment will only be reformed only where the party seeking 
reformation was without fault or neglect. Id,, at 704, 706. She 
misconstrues that rule of that case as it applies to the present 
action. The parties in West Virginia Oil & Gas, sought to modify 
a mistaken legal description in a judgment in a prior action that 
had been entered pursuant to a settlement agreement between the 
parties. West Virginia Oil & Gas could have discovered the error 
had it double-checked the description or had the property 
surveyed. As it was, the court stated that "the necessity of 
finality, " id., at 704, would not prevent the reformation of the 
(. . . continued) 
25
 The authorites relied on by Edward Gillmor included the 
decision of the United States Supreme Court in State of Wisconsin 
v. State of Michigan, 295 U.S. 455, 55 S. Ct. 786, 79 L.Ed. 1541 
(1935), which allowed an independent action for the purpose of 
reforming a mutual mistake in a decree relating to a boundary line 
between two states. See also United States v, Williams, 109 F. 
Supp. 456, 460-62 (W. D. Ark. 1952) (under Rule 60(b), court set 
aside a decree quieting title to real property 22 years later based 
on petitioner's mistaken reliance on her lawyer). 
26
 Shirley Gillmor brief, at 17 n. 8. 
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mistake in the prior judgment. This holding was in spite of West 
Virginia Gas & Oil' s neglect in not catching the error in the 
earlier proceeding. 
Similarly, Edward Gillmor' s failure to catch the error 
in the description of the Sawmill Canyon Road when the Partition 
Decree was first entered should not bar his claims in this case. 
Although he failed to notice the error in the legal description 
for the Sawmill Canyon Road when it was presented to the trial 
court in the Partition Action in Exhibit 113-D, that failure 
should not preclude his claim for reformation. The error in the 
exhibit was not created by him, but by Richard Huffman who was 
hired by Charles Gillmor. 
Moreover, the issue of access over the Sawmill Canyon 
Road should not be viewed in a vacuum. Questions of rights-of-
way and access were not at issue in the Partition Action. The 
entire case lasted over a period of years and involved complex 
issues under the Utah partition statute that were hotly contested 
between the parties, the most significant of which was which 
theory of partition should be used. Edward Gillmor' s failure to 
double-check the description of the Sawmill Canyon Road on 
Exhibit 113-D in the middle of this complex and difficult case 
and his reliance on the representations of the other parties that 
he would be given full access to the parcels awarded to him does 
-20-
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not rise to the level of the kind of negligence or fault 
necessary to cause his claim to fail. 
Obviously, any mistaken legal description that might 
find its way into a deed or decree could be caught if the parties 
were more prudent. Mistakes in legal descriptions are caused 
precisely because a party has overlooked the error or has failed 
to check it properly or to have the property surveyed. This kind 
of neglect has not prevented courts in the past from reforming 
legal descriptions to reflect the intent of the parties, and it 
should not do so in this case. Given the length and complexity 
of the Partition Action and the diminutive nature of the error in 
the metes and bounds description of the road in the Partition 
Decree, this Court should not hold against Edward Gillmor simply 
because he failed to catch the error immediately, any more than 
it should hold against Charles Gillmor because the error was 
caused by his own expert, Richard Huffman, and was overlooked by 
his own lawyer in the Partition Action. 
C. Edward L. Gillmor/ s independent action in 
equity is not barred bv laches. 
In her brief, Shirley Gillmor asserts that Edward L. 
Gillmor is barred because he did not assert his claims within a 
reasonable time after the Partition Decree was entered. 27 She 
In a footnote in her brief, Shirley Gillmor suggests that 
Edward Gillmor' s independent action in equity is somehow time-
barred by the statute of limitations that applies to reformation of 
(continued. . . ) 
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acknowledges this Court' s holding in St. Pierre v. Edmonds that 
an independent action in equity is controlled, not by statutes of 
limitation, but by "the doctrine of laches and other equitable 
principles."28 645 P. 2d 615, 618 (Utah 1987). Shirley did not 
raise the defense of laches in the lower court and cannot do so 
on appeal for the first time. Lane v. Messer, 731 P. 2d 488, 491 
(Utah 1986). 
Moreover, in order to establish a defense based on 
laches, Shirley would have to demonstrate that Edward Gillmor 
unjustifiably delayed bringing his claims and that she has been 
prejudiced by the delay. Papinikolas Brothers Enterprises v. 
Sugarhouse Shopping Center Associates, 535 P. 2d 1256, 1260 (Utah 
1975) (in order to establish laches, one must show (1) lack of 
diligence; and (2) an injury to defendant owing to such lack of 
diligence). Shirley Gillmor introduced no such evidence at 
trial. Her only allegation of prejudice is that her property 
27(. . . continued) 
deeds. (Shirley Gillmor brief, at 13 n. 7. ) That agrument must 
fail. Shirley Gillmore failed to raise that defense before the 
trial court and cannot raise it for the first time on appeal. 
Moreover, Edward Gillmor has not sued to reform a deed or 
instrument of conveyance, but to set aside or reform the Partition 
Decree pursuant to an independent action in equity, authorized 
under Rule 60(b), Utah Rules of Civil Procedure. As Edward Gillmor 
argued in his earlier brief, there is no statute of limitations 
regarding such actions. See authorites cited in Edward Gillmor' s 
intitial brief, at 41 & n. 20. See also St. Pierre v. Edmonds, 645 
P. 2d at 618. 
28
 Shirley Gillmor brief, at 22. 
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will be burdened by the additional use of the road. That is not 
the kind of prejudice, however, that must be shown in order to 
establish the defense of laches. The prejudice must arise as a 
result of the delay. Shirley Gillmor did not show any such 
prejudice at trial and, accordingly, cannot claim that Edward 
Gillmor7 s claims are barred by laches. 
In her brief, Shirley Gillmor cited Laub v. South 
Central Utah Telephone Assoc. , Inc. , 657 P. 2d 1304, 1306 (Utah 
1982), a case decided under Rule 60(b)(7), Utah Rules of Civil 
Procedure.29 Rule 60(b)(7), however, does not apply to the 
present case, which is an independent action in equity brought by 
Edward Gillmor. Although Rule 60(b) provides that a motion under 
Rule 60(b)(5), (6), and (7) must be brought "within a reasonable 
time" the rule does not state when an independent action must be 
brought. As the St. Pierre case held, the filing of such an 
action is governed only by "the doctrine of laches and other 
equitable principles. " 645 P. 2d at 618. 
This is not a case where Edward Gillmor sat on his 
hands and knowingly failed to pursue the correction of the error 
after the Partition Decree was entered. His son testified at the 
trial of the present action that after the entry of the Decree, 
4 
his father made no use of the Sawmill property until 1983 
pursuant to a stipulation with Stephen T. Gillmor. (Tr. Vol. I, 
^ Shirley Gillmor brief, at 23-24. 
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at 41. ) After 1983, he used his portion of the Sawmill property 
to graze horses and cattle, gaining access to the property by 
using the Sawmill Canyon Road, as he had traditionally done. He 
believed that he had a right to use the road. There was no other 
access to the range on the eastern portion of his property. (Tr. 
Vol. I, at 41-42, 65, 122-23.) As soon as he learned of the 
error in the description he sought the assistance of legal 
counsel. (Tr. Vol. I, at 65. ) 
Edward Gillmor has not waited an unreasonable time 
before bringing his action. The lapse of time between the 
conclusion of the Partition Action and the commencement of the 
present case did not cause any prejudice to Shirley Gillmor so as 
to sustain a laches defense. 
II. 
THE TRIAL COURT ERRED IN HOLDING THAT EDWARD 
L. GILLMOR WAS NOT ENTITLED TO AN EASEMENT BY 
IMPLICATION OR BY NECESSITY ACROSS SHIRLEY 
GILLMOR' S PROPERTY. 
Shirley Gillmor completely fails to explain or 
distinguish the legal authorities cited by Edward Gillmor in his 
brief showing his entitlement to an easement by implication or by 
necessity. She asserts that these doctrines have no meaning in 
the present case under "traditional notions of finality inherent 
in the doctrines of res judicata and collateral estoppel."30 
30
 Shirley Gillmor brief, at 25-26 (quoting from Finding of 
Fact No. 32, R. 885. ) 
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She fails to explain, however, why an easement should not be 
implied in the present case where the division of property was 
made by judicial decree. Nor does she inform the Court exactly 
how a partition of property by judicial decree is any different 
from a division of property by a conveyance from a common 
grantor. In his initial brief Edward L. Gillmor cited 
authorities that hold that an easement may be implied where a 
partition decree issued by a court has left one of the parties 
land-locked. 31 Shirley Gillmor failed to address these 
authorities in any way or to show why they do not apply. 
Shirley Gillmor attempts to set up a parade of 
horribles, suggesting that the Partition Decree was etched in 
stone, never to be disturbed, not even to correct an obvious 
error. 32 She ignores, again, the fact that her predecessor, 
61
 Edward L. Gillmor brief, at 28-29. 
32
 She stated in her brief: 
The final judgment in the partition case is a 
complex, finely tuned balance of property 
rights. No party was completely satisfied 
with the court' s decision, but to selectively 
return and tinker with the court' s allocation 
couldmean the start of a review of every 
single piece of property divided by the court, 
some of which have now been given away, sold, 
leased, and even lost to eminent domain. 
(Shirley Gillmor brief, at 26. ) Although there was no evidence 
presented at the trial of the present action that Shirley Gillmor, 
Stephen Gillmor, or Florence Gillmor were anything but "completely 
satisfied with the court's decision," there was evidence that they 
(continued...) 
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Florence Gillmor, proposed to the court in the Partition Action 
that the court "view the easements as items of continuing 
jurisdiction." (Exhibit D-51.) She overlooks the fact that, 
when Charles Gillmor' s counsel introduced Exhibit 113-D in the 
Partition Action, he told the court that the descriptions of the 
easements contained therein "could be modified by survey and by 
further order of the court should they prove unreasonable. " 
(Exhibit D-47. ) Shirley Gillmor also neglects to inform this 
Court that Florence Gillmor, her predecessor, also discovered 
errors in the Partition Decree after it was entered. (Testimony 
of Richard Huffman, Tr. Vol. I, at 200-06); Exhibits D-57, D-58. ) 
She fails to explain to this Court how it is that errors 
(including the error in describing the Sawmill Canyon Road) could 
have infected a decree that was such a "finely tuned balance of 
property rights."33 
In this light, the Partition Decree does not appear so 
impregnable. It was undoubtedly complex and represented an 
enormous amount of work both by the court and the parties. It 
was never intended, however, that errors could not be corrected 
(. . . continued) 
too sought to modify the Decree based on errors in legal 
descriptions. Richard Huffman admitted that the Partition Decree 
contained "typographical and clerical errors," (Tr. Vol. I, at 
200-06), as reflected in his two affidavits filed after the entry 
of the Partition Decree. (Exhibits D-57, D-58 in the present 
case. ) 
33
 Shirley Gillmor brief, at 26. 
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in order to give the parties access to the property awarded to 
them. In spite of Shirley Gillmor' s professed fears, Edward 
Gillmor does not intend to "selectively return and tinker" with 
the Decree.34 Nor does he seek to "review every single piece of 
property divided by the court."35 He has no desire to re-
examine properties that have been "given away, sold, leased, and 
even lost to eminent domain."36 All he seeks is the right to 
use the road that he used prior to the Partition Action and which 
he used thereafter until 1987. 37 Without that right, his 
Sawmill property is virtually useless to him, a result clearly 
not intended by the court in the Partition Action, which 
specifically found in its Findings of Fact that the Sawmill 
property could be partitioned "without great prejudice" to the 
owners. (Exhibit 33, at 21. ) Contrary to that specific intent 
of the court in the Partition Action, Edward Gillmor will suffer 
the greatest prejudice -- the loss of the use of most of the 
Sawmill property for grazing -- if this Court does not reverse 
the order of dismissal in the present case. 38 
s
* Shirley Gillmor brief, at 26. 
36
 id. 
37
 Tr. Vol. I, at 41-42, 65, 111-12, 122-23, 139. 
38
 If Shirley Gillmor is so concerned about reopening the 
entire Partition Decree, she should have no objection to the 
(continued. . . ) 
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CONCLUSION 
Edward L. Gillmor has established a right to an 
easement by implication or by necessity. The doctrines of res 
judicata and collateral estoppel cannot be used to prevent his 
claims for an easement, all of the elements of which he has 
established. Even if this Court decides that his claims to 
reform or modify the Partition Decree should be denied, the Court 
should still grant him the easement across the Sawmill Canyon 
Road, where it crosses Shirley Gillmor' s property, in order to 
give him access for grazing purposes to his own property. His 
claims for an easement are not linked to his claim for 
reformation of the Decree pursuant to his independent action in 
equity, but are separate and distinct. 
As an additional and alternative ground, under the 
independent action in equity Edward Gillmor is entitled to an 
order reforming or modifying the Partition Decree so as to 
correct the error in the description of the Sawmill Canyon Road, 
plainly not intended by the parties. 
d8(. . . continued) 
Couart' s merely holding that Edward L. Gillmor has an easement over 
the Sawmill Canyon Road by implication or by necessity. A finding 
that the elements of those doctrines have been met will not mean 
that the entire Decree would be re-examined. Edward Gillmor7 s 
claims for an easement by implication or by necessity are entirely 
separate and distinct from those for reformation of the Partition 
Decree under an independent action in equity. A holding by this 
Court that he has no right to reform the Decree does not mean that 
his claims for an easement by implication or necessity must also 
fail. 
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ADDENDUM 
The following documents are attached hereto: 39 
1. Copy of the transcript of the testimony of Stephen 
T. Gillmor from the first trial of the Partition Action, of which 
the trial court in the present case took judicial notice. 40 
(Transcript of First Trial in the Partition Action, at 327-40.) 
2. Copy of the Findings of Fact and Conclusions of 
Law in the "Trespass Case." 
DATED this Z 5 day of January, 1991. 
VAN COTT, BAGLEY, CORNWALL & MCCARTHY 
R. Stephen Marshall 
Attorneys for intervenor defendant 
and cross-appellant Edward L. 
Gillmor 
50 South Main Street, Suite 1600 
P. 0. Box 45340 
Salt Lake City, Utah 84145 
Telephone: (801) 532-3333 
39
 As indicated above, the following documents were included 
in the Supplemental Record designated by the parties in the present 
case, pursuant to Rule 11(h), Utah Rules of Appellate Procedure. 
40
 Tr. Vol. I, at 11-13. 
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CERTIFICATE OF SERVICE 
I hereby certify that I caused four true and correct 
copies of the within and foregoing Reply Brief of Cross -
Appellant/Intervenor-Defendant Edward Leslie Gillmor to be hand 
delivered this -^J day of January, 1991, to the following: 
James B. Lee 
John B. Wilson 
Parsons, Behle & Latimer 
185 South State Street 
Suite 700 
Salt Lake City, Utah 84111 
D. Gilbert Athay 
72 East 400 South 
Suite 325 
Salt Lake City, Utah 84111 
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IN THE DISTRICT COURT OF THE THIRD JUDICIAL DISTRICT 
IN AND FOR SALT LAKE COUNTY, STATE OF UTAH 
EDWARD LESLIE GILLMOR and 
SIV GILLMOR, his wife, 
Plaintiffs, 
FLORENCE GILLMOR, CHARLES 
GILLMOR and MELBA GILLMOR, 
Defendants, 
FIL V 
REPORTER'S RESIDUE 
APPEAL TRANSCRIPTION OF 
TRIAL PROCEEDINGS 
Civil No. 223998 
RLEO IN CLB»rr OrUg 
S«te U U Caufrty, U;«k" 
,1 FJ: 
FEB 15 1978 
W. Sttft;«fl £r«n, Otfk %H Om C«rt 
BE IT REMEMBERED, that on the 10th day ipf Mav. 1.977, 
commencing at the hour of 10:00 a.m., the above-entitled 
proceedings continued in trial in Courtroom Mo. One of 
the Metropolitan Hall of Justice, Salt Lake City, Utah; 
said cause being heard by the Honorable Peter F. Leary, 
Judge in the Third Judicial District, State of Utah. 
APPEARANCES 
Mr. E. J. Skeen, Attorney-at-Law, Skeen and Skeen, 
536 East Fourth South, Salt Lake City, Utah 84102, Tele-
phone 363-8037; and Mr. Rex J. Hanson, Hanson, VJadsworth & 
Russon, Kearns Building, Salt Lake City, Utah 84101, Tele-
phone 359-7611, appearing on behalf of the Plaintiffs. 
Mr. James B. Lee, Attorney-at-Law, Parsons, Behle & 
Latimer, 79 South State Street P.O. Box 11898, Salt Lake 
City, Utah 34147, Telephone 532-1234, appearing on behalf 
of Defendant Florence Gillmor. 
Mr. H. James Clear, Attorney-at-Law, Snow, Christensen &| 
Martineau, Continental Bank Bu 
8AA., Telephone 521-9000, appeJrin^oit-beh^Tlf of Defendants 
30 Charles F. Gillmor and Melba G. Gilfcnori; 1^ 78 
Jl'N 1 7 IT] - X : 1 
^*• • r y * v * ..——** 
Clark. Suocama Cuurt. Ut*h 
iiW&n<a, Sal t B t k e W i t y , Utah 
>eJring\)ir^ehVl  r ef  
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1 on that large mountain. 
2 THE COURT: Thank you. 
3 MR. LEE: We're ready to proceed to the Sawmill, 
4 your Honor. 
5 THE COURT: Go ahead. 
6 SAWMILL PROPERTY 
M MR. LEE: We'll call to the stand Steve Gillmor. 
8 (Whereupon, STEPHEN T. GILLMOR, JR., called as a wit-
9 ness by counsel for Defendant Florence Gillmor, and having 
10 previously been sworn to tell the truth, resumed the wit-
11 ness stand and testified upon his oath as follows:) 
12 DIRECT EXAMINATION 
13 BY MR. LEE: 
14\ Q. Excuse me a moment, your Honor. I'm looking 
15 for the overlay that we had marked yesterday with respect 
KM to this property. Mr. Gillmor, are you acquainted with 
17 what is described in this lawsuit as the Sawmill Property? 
18 A. I am; yes. 
19 Q, Please tell us where it's located? 
20 A. It's located up the Weber River above the Echo 
21
 Junction, which one goes to Evanston and one toward 
22
 Coalville; located above that junction to the east. 
23 T O orient the Court, and prior to the large rise in 
24
 elevation where you start up onto Wasatch, that's the 
25
 general location of it. 
2G\ And it's located to the north and to the west of the 
2? property in Sixth East as being Fifth East. 
2S\ Q. Referring specifically to Plaintiffs' Exhibit 
291 8P, is the Sawmill Property that shown in a green shaded 
•to area on the exhibit? 
EDWARD P. MIDGLEY, RPR 
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1 A. Yes , i t i s . 
2 ft Also referring to the Exhibit 8P, does the Inter-
21 state Highway which goes from Echo to Evanston, Wyoming 
4 up here on the Exhibit? 
• A. Yes, it corners on the lower southeast corner 
• of the area marked in green, and the section corner is 
M right on the roadway. It's right on the freeway. 
• Q. If I might indicate to the Court, on Exhibit 8P 
• where the Interstate Highway comes off of the edge of the 
10 map, it indicates 3.6 miles to Echo Junction. And on the 
11 east end of Exhibit 8P it indicates Evanston, Wyoming as 
12 being 22 miles away. Would you come over to the map, Mr. 
13 Gillmor? 
M j (Whereupon,the witness left the witness stand.) 
15 Q. And would you describe for the Court the type 
16 of property which we have in Sawmill? 
1? I A. It's a different—little different type of graz-
ing land than the most part—than this Sixth East. There 
are many areas indicated by this green color on the map 
underneath—or, on this map, that does have some timber 
areas and some portions as does Sixth East. 
22 But for the most part it's a more arid, sage-type 
231 area; more of a browse area than it is in Sixth East. 
Generally speaking it's lesser quality grazing land 
than is Sixth East. It's a much rougher, steeper grade 
area than the other grazing land. 
27 1 And the Sawmill Canyon itself is a sandstone forma-
28 tion, red in color, much like we know in the parks in Zions, 
291 et cetera, with sheer cliff areas. 
M As you start in on the south boundary of the property, 
EDWARD P MIDGLEY, RPR 
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1 it's very scenic in the lower end. Then as you approach 
2 a mile further to the north it opens up into a basin area 
3 of sage and browse, mainly, with some Aspen hollows that 
4 feed into it with forbs, also. 
* It has very distinct ridge and valley situations. 
6 1 That doesn't exist in the other area which is more rolling 
7 hills. 
* So, it's of a distinctly different type of grazing 
9 situation. 
10 0- Would you take the red pen and indicate what 
11 access is available to the Sawmill Property with an X on 
12 — w h e r e the access would come into the property? 
13 A. The vehicle access is at this point where Sawmill 
14 crosses the section line, and it's one mile to the north 
15 from the Interstate. 
16 The old highway is still in existence, and leaves 
17 access for the ranchers to get onto this area from the 
18 old highway, which was replaced by the Interstate system. 
19 And this is now the only vehicular road that is used 
20 by the Gillmors to get into this area. 
21 Qt And the witness has marked on Exhibit 8P an X 
22 near the Interstate, which would be where you take off to 
23 go on the private road, and an X which shows entry onto 
24 the Sawmill Property. 
25 A. Well, an exit onto the old road at Echo Junction, 
26 and travel in a parallel formation to the new Interstate 
27 up this distance from Echo Junction to this point. 
28 Then there's a locked gate, and Mr. Wright has a 
29 corral, et cetera, at this point and a locked gate. 
no And the Gillmors have a decree easement to travel 
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1 this mile across the Wright property onto the Sawmill 
2I Property. 
3 1 p. After you get onto the Sawmill Property, can you 
4 indicate to the best of your knowledge the vehicular road 
8 that is available? 
• A. Yes. The road continues up—originally it was 
M about into this area. And at the time they were operating 
• Gillmor Livestock in the beginning years, we did not in-
• corporate the use of the eight sections in our operation. 
W This was a trade-off lease with Bamberger Investment 
11 Company with lands incorporated into the Park City area. 
12 And due to water development, et cetera they dropped 
13 the lease. And so Uncle Ed at that time asked if I would 
14 go in there and see what I could do with the water thing 
15 and see if we could get a lease. 
16 So, at that time I went into the area, and where the 
17I road ended at a large spring, a natural spring that is up 
18 from this red X to the north, oh, gosh, about a quarter 
19 of a mile, was the end of the present road at that time. 
20 i hired some equipment to come in there, and we built 
21 a road on up into the basin area, which would be about 
22 where their red X would be, and again t o — w a t e r develop-
23 ments in the area, a n d — . 
24 Q. Just a moment, now. For the purpose of the 
25
 record it's very difficult, Mr. Gillmor. You have placed 
26 — i n the bottom portion of the property placed a small X. 
27 That's where the spring was located. Would you put an S 
28 by the spring? 
2i) A. This is just an approximation. 
:tt) 0- I understand. 
I 
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1 A. It's colored over. 
2 1 0- Then, the road. Would you trace the road to 
J the best of your knowledge from where it enters the lands 
4 up through the spring up to what you call the basin? 
8
 A. Well, the best I c a n — t h a t ' s relatively right. 
* Q. Would you put a B by the basin? what you've 
l\ called the basin? Is that nov; to the best of your knowledg^ 
8 the end of the roadway, or is there more roadway in the 
• property? 
M | A. No, this is not the end. There are roads, un-
11 improved roads that go up these canyons off to the east 
12 and work up onto the ridge lines. A n d — b u t this is where 
13 there's a reasonable grade and elevation grade. There is 
14 the end of the road. 
15 From this point on, going into these canyons to the 
1C east, it's very steep and very difficult to get out onto 
17 the ridge lines. 
18 Q. When you refer to the basin where the B is, you 
19 then say there are s o m e — w h a t type of roads; four-wheel 
20 drive vehicle roads? 
21
 A. These are--this is a road similar to those we've 
22 just described as Sixth East. You could get up here with 
23 an ordinary pickup, if necessary. It's more desirable to 
24 have a four-wheel drive, but from this point--. 
25 Q. When you say "this point," you've got to de-
26 scribe it for the record. 
27 A. From the basin area to the east and out onto 
28 the ridge area, that's necessary definitely to have a 
29 four-wheel drive vehicle, 
•to ft So when you first started in the operation, as 
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1 I understand it, this land was not used by the Gillmor 
2 Livestock Company as a part of its operation? 
4 A. No. It was a trade-off with the Bambergers on 
4 the lease. And I went up and hired this equipment to go 
5 in, and we started developing the springs and the roadways. 
• And at that time, we first leased the ground, or it 
M was leased, by way of my contract with the one operator. 
* Then he operated for one year. The the second year 
9 J it was leased to the Porter brothers. They operated for 
two years. 
11
 Then we used it subsequently after that and developed 
12 fencing, et cetera in the area. 
13 Bur during this period of time that the two first 
14 operators were on, the time was when the bulk of the 
15 springs were developed and made accessible for grazing use 
16 of the land. 
17 ft Would you indicate, please, on the exhibit the 
18 source of water of which you're aware? 
19 k I'd like to get my old map that I had where I 
20
 marked those springs, and I think I could do a better job 
2
*1 of plotting them. 
MR. LEE: All right. Mark these areas of water with 
a W, if you would, please. 
A. I'll mark this one W-l on Thirty Five Canyon. 
That was there—these were the ones we developed with 
large equipment. 
27 I The Thirty Five Canyon is a livestock access to be 
28 able to bring a herd of sheep from this point of the Inter-
29 state. 
;K> ft "This point of the Interstate;" you're going to 
22 
2 3 J 
24) 
25 
26 
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1 have to tell us where that is. 
2 A. Let me mark it with an X. This is clearly de-
3 1 fined on the map as Thirty Five Canyon across Section 35, 
4I and we were able to let sheep work their way up through 
6 this cliffy or very steep area to where it opened up about 
6 into here. 
7 So, this was one livestock access in Thirty Five 
8 Canyon. And there was water serving that prior to any 
9 1 development in the area. 
10 Q. Now, you've indicated on 8P with a circle and 
11 J a W those spots where you believe there are sources of 
12I water; is that correct? 
13 A. Yes, those are areas where we went in with a 
14 backhoe and dug the springs out and tilled them out and 
15 troughed or ponded them as the case was. 
1G ft You've indicated that there is an access for 
17 sheep. This would be in the southeast portion of the 
18 Sawmill Property. 
19 When you were operating in the partnership, and were 
20 utilizing this ground for leasing, what type of operation 
21 did you run on the Sawmill Property? 
22 A. When this was leased to the two operators prior 
23 to our usage, it was operated with sheep only. And this 
24 access was used at that time. 
25 When Gillmor Livestock used this property, we operated 
26 this with cattle and sheep, too, later on, 
27 Q. What's the latest time you've been up on the 
28 property, Mr. Gillmor? 
2<j A. Last summer, 
ui Q. Mr. Gillmor, I refer you to Defendants' Exhibit 
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1 58D and ask you if you are familiar with the proposed 
2 1 division of the Sawmill Property as shown on that exhibit? 
3] A. Yes, I have seen it. 
4 Q There happens to be on the exhibit the appearance 
5 of a little hole and then a small piece of property over 
6 to the left. Could you explain what that is? 
T A. This piece of property exhibited by the green 
8 square in Parcel 2 is owned by another person. It's a 
9 40 acre plot in the area of the basin as referred to 
10 earlier. 
11 0. And the little plot over to the left that's num-
12 bered 3? 
13 A. This is a parcel of Gillmor lands that I've not 
14 been upon owned by another party prior to Gillmor's pur-
15 chase. Gillmors purchased this piece of land during the 
16 time I was a partner in Gillmor Livestock, but I have never 
17 been on this piece of land. 
18 0- Do you know whether or not that land has been 
19 utilized by Gillmor Livestock, Mr. Edward Gillmor? 
20 A. I don't know. To my knowledge it hasn't. We 
21 never utilized it during the time I operated it. 
22 Qt Taking a look at Defendants' Exhibit 58D, does 
23 the division appear to be in equal quantity? 
24 A. Yes. 
25 Qt Based upon your experience with that property 
26 and the knowledge of its use, do you have an opinion as to 
27 whether or not the suggested division is equal in quality 
28 and quantity? 
29 A. Well, I think it would be as equal as it could 
30 possibly be divided as far as quality is concerned, and 
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1 certainly exactly equal in quantity. 
2
 ft With respect to the various parcels, if a di-
8
 vision were to be made by this Court, would it be neces 
* sary to have access up the road you've referred to across 
81 the various parcels? Would that access have to be avail-
able to all parties? 
A. Definitely so. The topography is so steep and 
rugged in the rear portion of this it is the only vehicle 
access onto the area. 
So, very definitely, this access would be—have to 
be left open for all parties to make use of the parcel. 
MR. LEE: No further questions of this witness. 
CROSS-EXAMINATION 
1 4
 | BY MR. CLEGG 
15 
e 
7 
8 
9 
10 
11 
12 
13 
1GJ 
17 
181 
19 
20 
21 
221 
2 3 J 
24 
25 
26 
27 
28 
29 
:t() 
Q. Mr. Gillmor, as one drives up the canyon from 
Echo there's some sheer red cliffs on the north side of 
the road. Can you identify where those cliffs are with 
relationship to the entrance of this property? 
A. Yeah, they're in the general vicinity—many 
years ago when the old highway come out, there was a big 
overhanging sandstone cliff. They used to put a prop 
under it. This is just above that. I think we've all 
seen that "prop that held the mountain up" there. 
This is the first opening above those sheer sandstone 
cliffs; the first gate and corral area above that where 
you go in. 
& And presently there's a rest station and informa-
tion station between Evanston and Echo. Is that anywhere 
near this property? 
A. Yes, that's above it; yes. 
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IN THE DISTRICT COURT OF THE THIRD JUDICIAL DISTRICT 
IN AND FOR SALT LAKE COUNTY, STATE OF UTAH 
FLORENCE GILLMOR, STEPHEN T. 
GILLMOR, and CHARLES F. 
GILLMOR, 
Plaintiffs, 
vs. 
EDWARD LESLIE GILLMOR and 
GILLMOR LIVESTOCK CORPORATION, 
Defendants. 
FINDINGS OF FACT 
AND CONCLUSIONS 
OF LAW 
Consolidated Case Nos. 
C-81-3875 
C-82-3490 
Judge J. Dennis Frederick 
THE ORDER, dated November 14, 1984, requiring EDWARD 
LESLIE GILLMOR to appear and show cause why he should not be held 
in contempt of court for violating the judgment and permanent in-
junction entered herein on November 7, 1983, by permitting his 
livestock to graze on land leased by STEPHEN T. GILLMOR, and why 
he should not pay damages, attorneys fees, and court costs, and 
THE ORDER, dated November 27, 1984, requiring STEPHEN T. GILLMOR 
to appear and show cause why he should not be held in contempt of 
court for violating the same judgment and permanent injunction by 
permitting his sheep to graze on the land of EDWARD LESLIE GILLMOl, 
T ? V T T T n T m ^ 
*ft4 «*/ hm should dot pay damages, attorneys fees, and court costs!, 
came on regularly for hearing before the Honorable J. Dennis 1 
Frederick on March 19, 1985; and the court having heard and con-
sidered the evidence adduced by the parties on the respective 
claims of the parties relating to contempt and for damages and 
attorneys fees, and being fully advised in the premises, now makes 
the following 
FINDINGS OF FACT 
1. This court made and entered a judgment and perman-
ent injunction in the above entitled consolidated cases, dated 
November 7, 1983, permanently restraining EDWARD LESLIE GILLMOR, 
GILLMOR LIVESTOCK CORPORATION, their agents, servants, employees, 
and attorneys, ft....from entering upon with livestock or grazing 
livestock upon the lands referred to as the Old Ranch, Improved 
and Sub-Irrigated East of the Sewage Canal, and upon any lands 
leased or possessed by STEPHEN T. GILLMOR, and upon any lands 
awarded to FLORENCE GILLMOR or CHARLES F. GILLMOR in the Judgment 
and Decree of Partition of February 14, 1981, as amended, in Civil] 
No. 223998 as set forth in Exhibit A attached hereto, with the ex A 
ception that use is permitted of all roadway easements, stock 
trails, and footway easements established in the said Judgment ana 
Decree of Partition.'1 
2. The Court, in the sane Judgment and Permanent In-
junction, similarly permanently restrained and enjoined STEPHEN 
T. GILLMOR, together with his agents, servants, employees, and 
-2-
attorneys fron entering upon with livestock or grazing livestock \ 
upon any of the lands awarded to EDWARD LESLIE GILLMOR by the 
above-mentioned Judgment and Decree with the same exception. 
3. The above-mentioned Exhibit A describes approxi-
mately 33,000 acres of land in Salt Lake, Tooele, and Summit 
Counties, comprising 17 blocks, which include some 64 separately 
described parcels. The parcels in each of the 17 blocks are ad-
jacent to other parcels in the same block. The boundaries of the 
separate parcels are, for the most part, unfenced, although both 
STEPHEN T. GILLMOR and EDWARD LESLIE GILLMOR are presently 
engaged in fencing boundaries of the separate parcels to avoid 
commingling of livestock and trespassing. 
4. The above-mentioned Judgment and Decree of Parti-
tion, dated February 14, 1981, was appealed to the Supreme Court 
of the State of Utah, and did not become final until December 3, 
1982. 
5. There have been numerous incidents in the year 
1984 of STEPHEN T. GILLMOR1S sheep grazing on land owned by 
EDWARD LESLIE GILLMOR, and numerous incidents in the year 1984 of 
EDWARD LESLIE GILLMOR'S cattle and sheep grazing on parcels of 
land owned by FLORENCE GILLMOR and CHARLES F. GILLMOR and leased 
from them by STEPHEN T. GILLMOR, but the proof has not been clear 
and convincing that each party had the ability to comply strictly 
with the Judgment and Permanent Injunction and that each party had 
willfully and knowingly violated such Judgment and Permanent 
-3-
- \ 
tmjimett**. Tb* court furtb*r finds that o«ltb«r party !• \ 
entitled to damages or attorneys fees against the other. From thel
foregoing Findings of Fact the Court draws the following 
CONCLUSIONS OF LAW i 
1. Neither EDWARD LESLIE GILLMOR or STEPHEN T. GILLMORj 
is guilty of contempt of court. 
2. Each of the above-mentioned orders to show cause 
should be dismissed and no judgment should be entered for damages, 
attorneys fees, or costs of court. 
DATED this Qfl^ay of WV \ ' 1985 
• 4 - THIScV / *" DAY C Y»H«rrr» n . . . . 
DSPirrf 
